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ABSTRACT Conservatives are taking aim at the field of public health, targeting its
efforts to understand and control environmental and social causes of disease. Richard
Epstein and others contend that these efforts in fact undermine people’s health and
well-being by eroding people’s incentives to create economic value. Public health, they
argue, should stick to its traditional task—the struggle against infectious diseases.
Because markets are not up to the task of controlling the transmission of infectious disease, Epstein says, coercive government action is required. But market incentives, not
state action, he asserts, represent our best hope for controlling the chronic illnesses that
are the main causes of death in industrialized nations. In this article, we assess Epstein’s
case.We consider his claims about the market’s capabilities and limits, the roles of personal choice and social influences in spreading disease, and the relationship between
health and economic inequality.We argue that Epstein’s critique of public health overreaches, oversimplifies, and veils his political and moral preferences behind seemingly
objective claims about the economics of disease control and the determinants of disease spread. Public health policy requires political and moral choices, but these choices
should be transparent.
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The Politics of Public Health
ICHARD EPSTEIN DOES NOT “DO” EUPHEMISM. He holds that a “moral philosophy of false comradeship” keeps us from selling human organs to high
bidders, that law should let hospitals “just say no” when poor people seek lifesaving care for self-inflicted harm, and that public financing of medical care for
the elderly is a bad idea (Epstein 1997, pp. 102–3, 282).1 Most health and safety
regulation, he says, imperils our health by trimming incentives to produce
wealth. And, well, as the Cat in the Hat says, “that is not all.”
Epstein’s prose provokes; it does not pander. And it challenges proponents of
government activism in the health sphere to consider consequences they do not
intend and contradictions they would rather ignore. For the most part, political
liberals have not done so. Epstein’s central claim, in his essay in this volume (Epstein 2003) and in his other writing on health and medicine, is that regulation
entails covert and coerced cross-subsidies that reduce our collective well-being
by diminishing our range of choices and our motivation to create value. Often,
he observes, these cross-subsidies are regressive: they transfer value from the
worse-off to the better-off in ways that fit awkwardly with their benevolent
intent. Sometimes, he charges, these subsidy schemes have a darker purpose: they
benefit politically potent actors at the expense of those less empowered.
These criticisms drive political liberals to distraction because they are so at
odds with liberals’ self-understanding. Proponents of public activism on behalf of
people’s health do not like to see themselves as undermining human health, wellbeing, or freedom. But Epstein’s criticisms have analytic bite. A diverse range of
well-meaning regulatory measures in the health sphere imposes cross-subsidies
that might meet stiff resistance if administered more openly, through the tax system. Requirements that hospitals provide free care to the uninsured operate
through cross-subsidies from insured patients—cross-subsidies that burden lower
and middle-class working people more heavily than they do wealthier Americans
(Bloche 1995). Protections afforded by the Americans with Disabilities Act impose costs that burden firms’ shareholders, customers, and employees.And, as Epstein notes, the costs of liability for harm ensuing from vaccines and pharmaceuticals are born by consumers, making these products less accessible.
Advocates of a robust state role in the health sphere ought to take such concerns more seriously. But Epstein overshoots the mark when he condemns virtually all contemporary health regulation on these grounds. Epstein far outruns
his empirical supply lines, and his judgments as to when markets do and don’t
work well rest on unstated moral assumptions. These assumptions also animate
his distinctions between autonomous and coerced conduct, and they lie behind
his attributions of causal responsibility.Taken together, these assumptions consti-

R

1 For

Epstein,“self-inflicted harm” encompasses not just drug and alcohol abuse, street violence, and
the like, but also such slip-ups as diabetic patients’ failure to test their blood glucose levels. Epstein
opposes Medicare “in the abstract” but cites “transition problems” as reason for not ending this program.
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tute an alternative morality of public health. This morality is largely libertarian,
but it tends toward social conservatism in matters of intimate conduct. It departs
sharply from the contemporary public health movement’s preferences for distributive equity and for a non-judgmental approach to people’s intimate behavior. These differences are political, and they should be debated and resolved
openly, in the political arena. They cannot be finessed through assertions about
the presence or absence of market failure, coercion, or causal responsibility.
In what follows, we develop this line of argument. We begin by taking issue
with Epstein’s sharp distinction between the “new” and the “old” public health.
We agree with Epstein that public health practitioners’ policy prescriptions have
evolved considerably since the 19th century, but we ascribe this to shifting patterns of illness and to 20th-century concerns about social equity, not to antimarket attitudes run amok.We then probe his claims about the scope of market
failure, the influences that do and do not constitute coercion, and the causation
of ill health. Finally, we raise concerns about his essay’s overgeneralization from
fair points to panoramic claims.

Is There a “New” Public Health?
We agree with Epstein that there is a “new” public health, broader in its reach
than was the 19th-century emphasis on control of infectious disease.This “new”
public health encompasses both a research agenda and a commitment to apply
scientific findings in the public sphere to reduce the social burdens of disease
(Gostin 2000, 2002). We believe that public health professionals, legislators, and
regulatory bodies should craft evidence-based responses to contemporary health
risks, provided that these responses balance the benefits of improved health
against potential economic costs and impositions on personal liberty. These
responses also need to take account of the comparative advantages of market and
regulatory mechanisms. Moreover, policymakers should acknowledge inevitable
trade-offs between short-term and long-term benefits (and costs).
The relationships between health, human freedom, and social and economic
well-being are extraordinarily complex. As Epstein observes, strong evidence
supports a causal connection between population-wide wealth and health. But
money by itself does not make people healthy; it works by expanding and improving people’s possibilities and capabilities—their educational and employment opportunities, their physical and social environments, and perhaps even
their subjective sense of well-being (Sen 1999). So how resources are spent matters enormously. The “new” public health seeks to gather and employ scientific
evidence to guide this spending—to direct it rationally toward disease prevention, environmental protection, and social investments that promote health by
broadening people’s options and capabilities. The “new” public health does not
profess to put health ahead of other social purposes. It acknowledges that people weigh health against other ends when making both market and political
S162
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choices. Neither does the “new” public health claim trump authority in all policy matters that touch upon health and disease. It concedes the equal and often
greater relevance of other sources of knowledge and ways of understanding
when society faces policy questions with health implications. It does, on the
other hand, offer political decision-makers a large and growing body of evidence
on the health consequences of alternative social and legal arrangements.
Epstein objects to this set of endeavors by creating a caricature—by spinning
the story of public health’s evolution and the law’s response so as to portray the
“new” as a radical departure from the “old.”We acknowledge that there has been
change since the 19th century—in disease risks and in the public values by
which market outcomes are politically judged. But what has not changed is public health’s commitment to promoting the health of populations by scientifically
proven and economically feasible means.A state-of-the-art account of the “new”
public health appears in a recent report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), The
Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century (2002; see also Gostin, Boufford,
and Martinez 2003).This report proposes an agenda for government and private
action to improve population-wide health. It calls for: (1) an improved state public health infrastructure (e.g., workforce, laboratories, and data systems); (2) programs aimed at scientifically proven determinants of population health; and
(3) wider private sector engagement in health promotion (encompassing business, academia, the media, and community institutions).
Public health researchers and commentators point to the mismatch between
government spending on medical services and medical care’s modest influence
on population health. More than 95 percent of federal and state health dollars
are spent on medical care and research, and only 1 to 2 percent is directed toward
prevention (Boufford and Lee 2001; Eilbert et al. 1996). Paltry levels of public
spending on population-wide health programs have left public health agencies
in “disarray,” unable to effectively conduct health promotion and disease prevention programs (IOM 1988, 1996a, 1996b, 2002).Yet there is much evidence that
access to medical care is less important as a determinant of health than are
behavioral and environmental factors (McGinnis and Foege 1993). Epidemiological studies have identified strong correlations between population-wide
health status and a variety of social, physical, and economic conditions of life.
Research aimed at explaining these correlations is ongoing and highly promising. To the extent that this research yields opportunities for action to promote
health at low cost, by comparison with medical services, it should appeal to proponents of parsimony in public spending.
Instead of expanding government’s role in response to these opportunities, the
“new” public health calls upon private actors to share the work of health promotion. The IOM’s report on the future of public health points both to political constraints on public intervention and to the importance of private actors in
shaping social and environmental conditions that influence health. The IOM
identified five private sector categories: health care institutions, business entersummer 2003 • volume 46, number 3 supplement
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prises, the mass media, academia, and community groups.To be sure, the “new”
public health is broader in its reach than the 19th-century public health agenda
Epstein would prefer: it looks beyond control of infectious disease to physical,
social, economic, and other environmental risk factors for illness more generally
(IOM 1988; Petersen and Lupton 1996; Tulchinsky and Varvikova 2000).2 But
this larger agenda reflects changes that Epstein underplays, including the growing impact of chronic illness, the suppression of once-fearsome infectious diseases, and our deepened understanding of environmental determinants of illhealth.
It is unsurprising that public health regulation in 19th- and early 20th-century America focused on prevention and control of infectious disease—and that
judicial review of such regulation deferred so readily to government action to
control contagion. As Epstein notes, the alacrity of infectious disease transmission and the impossibility of tracing the sources of infection case-by-case precluded effective legal governance of the risks of airborne and waterborne illness
through a system of private rights and duties. Judicial acceptance of such measures as quarantine and mandatory vaccination made sense even amidst a laissezfaire ethos, because neither private law nor market incentives could manage the
externality problems arising from contagion. Until the antibiotic revolution of
the 1930s and 1940s, infectious diseases were, by far, the dominant threats to the
public’s health and security (Duffy 1990; McNeill 1976). During the Civil War,
two-thirds of Union Army deaths and three-quarters of Confederate Army
deaths were due to infectious disease. Migration to cities during the early industrial era created conditions ripe for disease transmission—overcrowded slums,
homelessness, infestations, and squalor (Fee 1997). Epidemics of smallpox,
cholera, measles, diphtheria, typhoid fever, and influenza recurred unpredictably,
killing thousands.
This existential threat, cognizable in economic terms as a problem of uncontrolled externalities, gave rise to the idea of a public law response to health danger. Legislatures and agencies targeted living conditions and vectors of disease
transmission. Regulatory measures addressed cleanliness and hygiene; these
included inspections, sanitary requirements, and nuisance abatement (Novak
1996). Regulation also targeted behaviors associated with disease transmission. It
compelled such measures as vaccination, testing and screening, partner notification, and, in the extreme, isolation and quarantine. These 19th- and early 20thcentury regulatory interventions laid a legal foundation for later public responses
to health risks that raised externality and other market failure issues.
As the threat of infectious diseases waned and as concern about cardiovascu2 Different

commentators have employed the term “new” public health in different ways (Petersen
and Lupton 1996). But these uses of the term share our emphasis on the multiple environmental
and life circumstances that shape people’s health, and on the importance of broad-based private as
well as public action to promote health.
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lar disease, cancer, diabetes, and other chronic diseases mounted, health researchers and policymakers looked to build on this foundation. The leading causes of
death in the United States today are heart disease, cancer, cerebrovascular diseases, chronic respiratory illnesses (principally asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema), and unintentional injuries (National Center for Health Statistics 2002).
The “new” public health targets their “upstream” causes (McGinnis and Foege
1993). A sedentary lifestyle and poor eating habits contribute to obesity, a risk
factor for four of the leading causes of mortality (Friedman 2000; Mokdad et al.
2003; NCCDPHP 2002; Siegel et al. 1993).3 Exposure to toxic substances in the
environment and the workplace also contributes to the leading causes of morbidity and mortality, especially cancer and chronic respiratory diseases. Smoking,
the most important preventable cause of death in America, is a potent risk factor for cardiac and other vascular disease, cancer, and chronic respiratory illnesses
(NCCDPHP 2003).
Epstein treats public health’s efforts to target these “upstream” factors through
public law as a radical departure from its 19th-century focus on contagion.
Whereas he stresses the differences, we see similarities.Today, as in the 19th century, public health aspires to lower population-wide risk by identifying and addressing the largest influences on morbidity and mortality. The epidemiological
transition from infectious disease to chronic disease arising from lifestyles and
environmental exposure has shifted the focus of public health research and action
from contagion to people’s social and physical environments. Policy proposals
that have ensued from this new emphasis aim, for the most part, to empower
people to make healthy choices. Stated in economic language, externality problems remain an important basis for public intervention: examples include environmental toxins, insufficient time and space for exercise, and nutritionally inadequate food in public schools. But many of the regulatory measures urged by
proponents of the “new” public health address other market failures, including
insufficient information about health risks and, more controversially, economic
actors’ ability to influence people’s preferences through symbols of fashion,
“cool,” and sensuality (Gostin 2000).

The Politics of Market Failure
Epstein’s challenge to the “new” public health relies heavily on his claim that it
calls for government intervention not justified by genuine market failure. But
market failure can be discerned only by reference to some normative conception of what markets are supposed to achieve. Standard accounts of the rationale
for regulation refer to a variety of market failures, including positive and negative externalities, inadequate information, and moral hazard (Breyer 1980). Ex3 Approximately

65 percent of Americans over 20 years old are overweight, and 30.5 percent are

obese.
summer 2003 • volume 46, number 3 supplement
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ternalities, though, can be identified and assayed only by reference to moral or
political judgments about what should count as a social good (or bad) and how
these goods (and bads) should be valued. Whether an actor has enough information to make an informed, autonomous choice is a moral—not an exclusively
empirical—question (Bloche 2003). And assessment of the waste induced by socalled “moral hazard,” the propensity of people to demand more of something
when they bear less than its full cost, is not possible without a normative judgment about how much of the thing they should ideally demand (Bloche 2003).
Epstein makes many such normative judgments; he just doesn’t acknowledge
them.We highlight several to illustrate the point. He criticizes laws barring employment and health insurance discrimination against people living with HIV/
AIDS on the ground that these laws compel cross-subsidies for risky behavior
(e.g., intravenous drug use and unprotected sex), thereby lowering its social price
(moral hazard) and increasing its incidence. On the other hand, he rejects the
idea of liability for fast-food chains for selling dangerously fatty meals on the
ground that consumers should exercise self-restraint. He thus allows fast-food
firms to benefit from moral hazard (by imposing much of the social cost of serving dangerous food on others), while rejecting anti-discrimination laws’ creation
of moral hazard in the form of a diminished social price for sex and drug use
that spread HIV infection.
Only underlying moral judgment can explain this apparent inconsistency.
People who have risky, unconventional sex or who abuse drugs should bear the
full social price of their behavior—or perhaps even an inflated price, insofar as
employment or health insurance discrimination is based on exaggerated expectations of medical risk and cost. But firms that entice consumers to eat life-endangering food should be able to pass much of the social price of doing so onto
these consumers. Discerning cross-subsidies here, as elsewhere, is a normative endeavor that builds on baseline premises about the proper scope of personal (and
corporate) responsibility.
Another example is Epstein’s critique of occupational health and safety regulation, a critique he roots in regulators’ limited abilities to anticipate potential
consequences of their actions (Epstein 2003).4 He chides occupational health regulators for acting based on worst case risk scenarios—for “proceed[ing] under the
banners ‘better safe than sorry’ or ‘best to err on the side of safety’” (Epstein
2003). Citing Nichols and Zeckhauser (1986), he warns of the “perils of prudence”—the likelihood that over-regulation of remote risks not only wastes
money but increases risk by bringing about unanticipated consequences. Yet he
endorses morals regulation directed at sexual sin, by invoking the precautionary
4 Epstein

indicates his preference for governance of occupational health risks via contracts between
employers and workers, a preference tied to his skepticism about regulators’ ability to do better than
employees at anticipating the potential health and financial consequences of alternative risk management arrangements.

S166

Perspectives in Biology and Medicine

13/Gostin/Final/S160–75

6/22/03

12:50 PM

Page S167

The Politics of Public Health

rationale that he condemns in the occupational health context. In the 19th century, he says,“prostitution, fornication, adultery, homosexuality, sodomy, bestiality,
bigamy, polygamy, and incest” posed unknown risks of contagion.These uncertain
risks, he suggests, justified regulatory proscriptions against sexual sin “even in the
absence of specific knowledge of the mechanisms of [disease] transmission.”
Likewise, traditional morals laws, targeting places of “sinful” sex, could have
slowed the spread of AIDS before its mechanisms of contagion became known.
Making “clear evidence of disease transmission” a prerequisite for shutting down
centers of promiscuous sex risked loss of the chance to gain control of a deadly
epidemic at an early stage.“All this suggests,” he writes,“that the critical time for
preventive measures is before the risk is fully understood” (Epstein 2003).
There are arguments for and against erring on the side of safety when the
mechanisms and magnitude of risks are uncertain. Critics of environmental law’s
“precautionary principle,” which embodies the prudence Epstein disparages in
the occupational health sphere, point to the difficult-to-calculate opportunity
costs of prudence (Morris 2000). They also highlight the problem of wholly
unanticipated risks—a problem that “precautionary” policy toward uncertain but
known risks fails to address. Epstein does not explore the theoretical basis or empirical support for these arguments. Instead, he alternately disparages and endorses the precautionary approach, in a fashion that correlates tightly with
whether regulation targets business firms’ risk-creating conduct or people’s intimate behavior. Nowhere does he declare that regulatory policy in the health
sphere ought to embody either Lochnerian deference to economic power or traditional Judeo-Christian sexual morality.5 But nowhere does he explain the
patent inconsistency in his treatment of the precautionary approach.

The Politics of Personal Responsibility
Ascriptions of personal responsibility and distinctions between autonomous and
coerced conduct play a central role in Epstein’s challenge to the “new” public
health’s approach to public law. His allegations of oppressive and inefficient regulatory cross-subsidy rest on his premises about the scope of personal responsibility—premises infused with moral preferences he does not acknowledge.
Moral judgment about the scope of individual responsibility is not objectionable; to the contrary, it is the stuff of much of politics and law. As Hannah
Arendt (1994), among others, has observed, justice would be an outmoded institution were it not for our willingness to assign individual culpability despite our
ability to explain behavior in deterministic terms. Health researchers and poli5 See

Lochner v. New York (1905), which holds that a New York law setting minimum work hours
for bakers violated the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Lochner came to stand for the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on freedom of contract, as a matter of form, without regard for disparities of economic power.
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cymakers make a category mistake by treating scientific understandings of environmental, behavioral, and other determinants of disease as grounds for rejecting
personal responsibility. A high-profile case-in-point was the 1996 contretemps
over presidential candidate Robert Dole’s assertion that smoking is voluntary,
not addictive (New York Times 1996). Dole backed away from this claim (which
the press covered as a campaign gaffe) in the face of criticism that it contravened
prevailing medical understanding. But Dole had a point: the availability of a
deterministic account of smoking (“it is addictive”) does not require people to
embrace this account in the political or legal realms. Scientific understandings
are substrates, not substitutes, for political and legal judgments.
Indeed, people often adhere at the same time, in the therapeutic and public
realms, to deterministic and autonomy-regarding accounts of problematic
human conduct. Individuals seek treatment, or are referred to it, for myriad behaviors that the law treats as matters of personal responsibility (Brandt and Rozin
1997).6 Researchers seek social, psychological, and even biological explanations
for the most horrific human actions, yet civilization holds their perpetrators accountable in settings like Nuremberg and The Hague. Ascription of personal
responsibility involves moral judgment, and often a measure of politics, in matters of health and disease as in other realms. And here, Epstein hides the ball.
For example, he treats risky sex with multiple partners as something fomented
by “sinful” institutions, such as gay bathhouses, but he treats risky eating as a matter of personal choice. “It is harsh, counterproductive, and unwise,” he says, “to
go after individuals for their sexual practices,” but at supermarkets and fast food
outlets, “children and their parents should be able to exercise some degree of
self-restraint” (Epstein 2003). Epstein’s moral rationale for this distinction escapes
us, but the moral consequence—culpability for an institution at the social fringe
and non-accountability for businesses in the American mainstream—is clear.
By insulating uninhibited coupling, but not eating, from ascription of personal responsibility, Epstein takes aim at the infamous bathhouses while putting
sellers of high-risk food beyond the law’s reach. Bathhouses, not their sex-craving patrons, he holds, were responsible for the early spread of HIV. Government
should have closed them, since the state should target “institutions that facilitate
harmful interactions with adverse third-party health effects.” But McDonalds is
not responsible, Epstein asserts, when fat-craving diners order fries and McNuggets steeped in artery-clogging oils.7 McDonalds’ patrons are responsible—they
should exercise “self-restraint”—and holding the firm liable for serving risky
meals is therefore wrong. Encouraging sex that kills is unacceptable, but promoting food that kills is unexceptionable.
6 In

addition to smoking, examples include overeating, sexual infidelity, domestic violence, pedophilia, and gambling.

7 For

a vivid description of the high-fat and other unhealthy additives that may make McNuggets
more hazardous than consumers reasonably expect, see Pelman v. McDonald’s (2003).
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This is moral politics, not moral reasoning, and it drives Epstein’s charge that
liability for selling risky meals would levy an oppressive, inefficient cross-subsidy.
Since people choose to eat McNuggets, he holds, the higher price they would
pay to cover tort damages constitutes a cross-subsidy from fit calorie-counters to
the corpulent, who are more likely to get sick and to die—and to sue. Those
who overindulge should bear the costs that come with their choice; thus this
cross-subsidy is inefficient, since it passes part of the cost of overindulgence from
those who incur it to calorie-counters who show restraint.8

The Politics of Causation
Epstein’s conclusions about cause and effect play an equally important role in his
critique of the “new” public health’s uses of public authority. His claims of causal
connection, like his ascriptions of personal responsibility, undergird his opposition
to government measures that reach beyond control of contagious disease. And,
like his judgments about responsibility, his ideas about causal connection (and its
absence) are animated by moral content he is disinclined to acknowledge.
Epidemiologists, like other scientists, tend to understand causation as a complex web of interactions between prior phenomena—a web of interactions that
make the occurrence under study more (or less) likely. In theory, the sum total
of these interactions determines whether the occurrence under study does or
does not happen. In practice, the scientific method cannot study the sum total of
these interactions, all at once. At best, scientists can craft simplified models of
these interactions, then examine one or a few of these interactions at a time, by
controlling all variables except for a small number. By this plodding method, epidemiologists come up with correlations and with probabilities of causal relationships (IOM 2001; Karasek 1990; Kunzli 2002; Pearce and Davey-Smith
2003; Rice and Atkin 2000; van Poppel and van der Heijden 1997).9 They can
8 One

could easily offer an analogous assessment of the shutdown of gay bathhouses. By making it
harder—more costly—for gay men to couple with multiple partners, shutting down the bathhouses
burdens promiscuous gay men who have “safe sex” and thus pose minimal risk of spreading HIV.
Through their greater inconvenience or diminished sexual pleasure, these men bear part of the cost
of an AIDS prevention strategy that does not discriminate based on the differential risks posed by
different bathhouse patrons.They thereby cross-subsidize, in effect, disease-free sexual partners (and
intravenous drug abusers) “downstream” from gay men who would have dangerous sex with more
partners were the bathhouses to remain open. Epstein’s failure to offer this assessment reflects his
disinclination to treat sex-seeking bathhouse patrons as accountable choosers—and his disinclination to give much weight to sexual inconvenience and diminished sexual pleasure as costs. Our
own agreement with the policy of bathhouse closure reflects our sympathy with these underlying
judgments. Our only point here is that Epstein must render such judgments, at least tacitly, in order
to avoid treating bathhouse shutdown as a case of nettlesome cross-subsidization.

9 Research

data exist to support policy initiatives relating to each of the key determinants of health:
the natural environment—e.g., clean air, water, and other natural resources—and the physical or
built environment—e.g., transportation, buildings, green spaces, and roads. These findings are
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disprove causal relationships, but they cannot definitively discern them. Based on
this fragmentary evidence, health professionals and policymakers play the percentages, by targeting (through therapeutic or regulatory intervention) one or a
few of the most likely causal interactions.
Inevitably, political, cultural, and moral influences shape the selection of targets. And, inevitably, tensions between these influences engender conflict over
target choice. AIDS prevention is the most bitterly contested case: debates over
condom and clean needle distribution, closing down places of promiscuous sex,
and promotion of abstinence versus safe sex are illustrative (Gostin 2003). Controversies over tobacco liability, restrictions on cigarette marketing, and the
prospect of liability for sale of artery-clogging foods are other examples. Public
health activists err by rejecting any role for politics and moral judgment in the
selection of disease prevention strategies. The entry of politics and morals into
health promotion is inevitable, and debate over the cultural and moral matters at
stake is, we think, an appropriate part of health policymaking in a democratic
society. Epstein all but ignores this scientific and political complexity. In its place,
he proclaims simply that something is or is not a cause of disease, and that policymakers should intervene or restrain themselves, accordingly. He nowhere
acknowledges the moral content of these conclusions—conclusions that happen
to correlate closely with his politics. An example is his acceptance of social factors as causes of the AIDS epidemic, in conjunction with his dismissal of their
relevance for obesity and its health consequences. “Sinful” bathhouses, excesses
of “associational freedom,” and failure of monogamous commitment are causal
factors and appropriate targets of legal intervention, he holds. But corporate
promotion of fattening foods and couch potato habits is not responsible for obesity (in either the scientific or legal sense); individuals bring it upon themselves,
through their consumptive choices.10
Likewise, Epstein’s broad-brush dismissal of hypothesized causal connections
between socio-economic disadvantage and ill-health overlooks nuance in transparent pursuit of his opposition to redistributive policies. He notes, as have we,
that population-wide health status correlates with overall income, that public
policies that shrink society-wide wealth risk reducing population health, and
that aggressive redistribution of wealth erodes incentives that spur growth and
thereby improve health (Bloche 2001b). He also points to a correlation between
enduring income inequality and dramatic improvements in infant mortality rates
in England over the past century (Epstein 2003). But he ignores evidence that
embedded within an influential ecologic theory that characteristics of places—neighborhoods,
schools, work sites, etc.—carry with them health risks for people who live or work there.
10 To

be sure, he says that “people are more likely to eat to excess if others around them do so first,”
but he dismisses this as “influence,” not “coercion,” and suggests that this influence may cut the
other way. Awareness that others are imperiling themselves, he says,“may spur” some to take greater
care of themselves.
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societies with similar mean incomes differ widely in their performance on standard measures of population health. (Sen 1999; Wilkinson 1996). There is lively
debate over whether poorer performance on population health measures correlates with steeper society-wide gradients in personal income (Kawachi and Kennedy 1997; Mellor and Milyo 2001). It is well-established, however, that societies
with higher levels of absolute deprivation—that is, higher proportions of people
too poor to create and purchase healthful conditions of life—fare worse on population health indices (House 2001).11 And it is also well-established that among
nations with similar mean incomes, those with recent histories of higher investment in education, public health programs, and other social infrastructure perform much better on measures of population health (Sen 1999).
This suggestive but incomplete evidence points toward a research agenda that
might shed light on how public policy can more effectively promote health and
human well-being. How does being at the bottom end of the income scale undermine health? Is the problem mainly one of consumer buying power—access
to decent food, housing, and other material goods? Or does diminished access to
education and employment opportunities play a crucial role, and might public
intervention in this realm be a better investment, dollar for dollar, than provision
of material goods? To what extent does the psychosocial stress of life at the bottom end make poorer people sicker? And to what extent do both poor health
and low socioeconomic standing flow from third factors—maladaptive behavior,
perhaps (Deaton 2002)? 12 Finally, there is a large challenge here for development
economists. It is one thing to say, as we and Epstein do, that incentives arising
from income inequality spur economic growth, and that growth, in general, promotes population-wide health. It is another, much more difficult task, to understand how, and to what degree, different profiles of income inequality engender
different kinds, as well as rates, of growth. And it is yet another, equally challenging task to specify the connections between different types and rates of
growth and people’s health and well-being.
The deepening of our understanding along these lines will require both robust empirical research and reflective debate about values, goals, and present and
future trade-offs. Political conservatives eschew this enterprise because it promises to enhance the potential of the activist state. And we concede that expanding the domain of public health to encompass the socioeconomic conditions for

11 This

effect is believed to operate both through inadequate individual (and family) buying power
and through the tendency of societies with higher proportions of socioeconomically disadvantaged
people to provide lower levels of such health-enhancing public goods as education, sanitation, and
recreational space.

12 The

poor, some suggest, may have worse health because of genetic differences, behavior, or
reduced access to health care or education. Or perhaps the causal relationship works in the other
direction: poor health could lower income through diminished ability to work or higher medical
costs.
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human well-being raises questions of overreach. Not only do public health researchers and professionals lack the needed multidisciplinary expertise, but the
knowledge they do have does not give them standing to specify public values or
limits on state intrusiveness. These are tasks for politics. But public health
research can and should inform the politics of socioeconomic equity, as well as
the politics of personal responsibility.
Health researchers and professionals err by treating health as a trump value:
society sacrifices health in the service of liberty and myriad aesthetic and other
ends. Yet health matters enormously in our lives and our politics. Mounting
proof of the social and environmental determinants of illness has the potential to
move Americans toward support for a more activist state. Epstein and other conservatives fear this prospect as both a threat to economic liberty and a feeding
opportunity for interest groups positioned to use state power for parochial ends
(Gingrich 2001).13 They could best cope with these concerns—and check
activist excess—by engaging the available evidence more rigorously than they
have so far.

Conclusion
The “new” public health is less coercive, in the conventional sense, than its 19thcentury regulatory antecedents. It eschews physical compulsion, such as quarantine and coerced therapy, except as a last-ditch step, and it sees synergies between
health promotion and respect for human rights (Bloche 2001a; Mann et al.
1994). It has been much influenced by the bioethics revolution of the 1960s and
1970s, which made personal autonomy the prime directive in medical matters
(Rothman 1992), and it has been much criticized for this, especially in the AIDS
context.
The “new” public health has raised political conservatives’ ire, though, by extending its reach beyond the traditional domain of infectious disease to social
and economic influences on population-wide health. In so doing, it has inquired
into causal connections between ill-health and such powerful institutions as tobacco companies, industrial polluters, firearm manufacturers, and fast-food
chains. Although Epstein levies the charge that it has resorted to state coercion
in this sphere, it has in fact employed state power in limited fashion.To be sure,
government has resorted to command-and-control regulation in the environmental and occupational safety realms.14 But the state’s approach to the con13 Conservative

icon Newt Gingrich has taken on proponents of a connection between economic
inequality and ill-health, charging that efforts by public health researchers to document such connections constitute an attack on the free enterprise system.

14 One

might add consumer purchase of pharmaceuticals and medical devices to this list, but Epstein does not complain about command-and-control regulation in this realm, perhaps because it
long predates the late 20th-century regulatory endeavors he targets in his essay.
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sumer has been quite restrained. With trivial exceptions, such as seatbelt and
motorcycle helmet requirements, the law has sought to promote information
flow and to persuade—rather than compel—consumers to behave safely. Warning requirements for cigarettes and alcohol, restrictions on advertising, and campaigns encouraging healthy eating and discouraging smoking have been the
mode.15 Suits against tobacco companies by victims of smoking-related illnesses
have mostly failed, ironically because of warning requirements.
More threatening by far, for political conservatives, is the “new” public
health’s attention to social and economic determinants of illness and well-being.
A promotional leaflet for an American Enterprise Institute forum on putative
links between income inequality and health warned in 2001 of the topic’s “farreaching implications such as the restructuring of important sections of our economic system.”We doubt that revolution is impending, but growing evidence of
connections between social conditions and health could give social fairness new
force as a political issue.Americans are more tolerant of disparities in wealth than
they are of inequalities in health. In economics language, they tend to see health
as a “merit want”—something to be distributed more equitably than goods allocated based on the prevailing distribution of wealth.To the extent they see health
as tied to wealth, economic disparities could emerge as suspect. The future
course of research in this area could prove politically decisive. If it confirms and
clarifies a close connection between social disadvantage and health, it could
become the “new” public health’s principal public policy legacy.
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